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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of acquisition 
research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) put down 
one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary draft of an 
eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a technical 
note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among practitioners and 
researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of mutual importance.     
A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and research institutions 
to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its infant stages.  The 
primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition issues/problems that 
will become part of the acquisition professional body of knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues such as articles in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical 
reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or a variety of 
other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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The Impact of Software Support on System Total 
Ownership Cost 
As a spin-off of the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) research that Mike Boudreau 
and I conducted, there was some interest in examining the TOC implications of software 
intensive systems and what the software component is adding to the TOC burden.  I 
thought it would be interesting to get into this, it felt a lot like opening ‘Pandora’s Box.’ 
The Growing Problem 
We are obviously significantly dependent on these software systems.  Virtually 
everything we have is moving into a software intensive system.  We’ve gone from the 
M-16 rifle to our new objective individual combat weapon, which has lines and lines of 
software code.  We want to put these together in the system of systems that Dr. Gansler 
talked about in the keynote presentation at the Symposium. 
These systems of systems are going to be an important concept as we talk about 
TOC and the software drivers linked into the difficult interfaces that are associated with 
making a system of systems work effectively.  Software maintenance is becoming an 
ever-increasing part of the TOC of our systems.  To summarize, 
• All DOD Systems are increasingly dependent on large, sophisticated software 
systems. 
• The Software Intensive Systems are part of a “System of Systems”, dependent 
on complicated interfaces for required interoperability. 
• Software ‘Maintenance’ becoming a major Total Ownership Cost (TOC) driver. 
Magnitude of the Problem 
How big is the problem?  With the lack of databases that we discovered in the 
first research effort, we do not have a really good accounting of how much money is 
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Some estimates indicate we spend about $30 Billion a year on embedded 
weapons system software.  This is not the management information systems piece; this 
is literally the tactical systems portion.  Of that, about $21.6 Billion is attributed to 
software maintenance and it’s continuing to grow.  Given what Dr. Gansler said, we 
spend about $80 Billion a year overall, a quarter of it being software maintenance at this 
time and growing. 
The cost data is hard to come by, with few data sources.  I asked a number of 
program managers what it costs to support software.  They are less than forthcoming 
with numbers, which might be attributed back to the program, as it is typically a large 
number.   
One of the pathologies I encounter is that we don’t want to talk about the TOC of 
systems. The rational is that decision makers, Congressmen and others who can kill a 
program, are not seeing numbers presented in a way to illuminate TOC.  No one wants 
to be the first to say that an M-1 tank doesn’t cost $2 Million a copy; it actually costs $12 
Million a copy if you look at it from the TOC perspective.  Someone unfamiliar with the 
concept of evaluation would look at those numbers and eventually cancel the program. 
I was able to locate information on the B1-B Bomber program; this is the old 
Reagan era Bomber.  I happened to work with the software maintenance manager of 
that system who said her budget was $980 million a year to support the software only 
on the B1-B Bomber.  That gives some perspective on the number of dollars being put 
into software maintainability. To summarize, 
• Approximately $30 Billion annually expended on embedded weapon systems 
software with $21.6b attributed to support 
• Very little software support cost data available 
 Few data bases 
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• B1-B Bomber annual software support budget is approximately $980 million 
 
Software Supportability’s Nature 
What is software maintenance?  We often talk about it as if it’s a supportability 
thing like hardware maintenance. Software maintenance is really software 
reengineering.  Those responsible for software maintenance are software engineers or 
software professionals.  To hire that group of people, the cost is much higher than for a 
typical hardware maintainer.  Automatically, the cost-basis for hiring people to support 
our software are higher. It is also important to note, software systems are changed at a 
much higher rate than hardware systems.   
As a point of reference, software is actually deployed with the knowledge that 
there are thousands of latent errors throughout and those errors will be identified in use.    
For example, when Microsoft released Windows XP, the very day of the release, 2.8 GB 
of patches needed to go on it.  You have to expect the errors in these things.  In fact, if 
Microsoft met their own goal for errors per 1000 lines of code; XP would have 8 million 
errors.  That’s what is expected in a software build, due to the complexity of it.  Software 
is a different animal than what we have grown accustomed to in hardware deployment. 
Interfaces between software systems and hardware within these systems of 
systems are critical to make the systems of systems run efficiently.  When one change 
is made to one system within the system of systems, it requires interface changes to 
ripple across the rest of the systems that are involved.  Sometimes the interfaces are 
seamless and go well and no interoperability problem occurs. More often than not, a 
single change in software function requires changes throughout the system of systems.  
This is a driving factor that continues to increase the maintainability rates for the 
software. 
Along the same line, software must be upgraded continuously to maintain 
required levels of performance within the system.  For example, the M-1 Abrams office 
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Hardware systems do not change that frequently, it becomes much more difficult to 
maintain the integrity of our software systems. In summary, 
 
• To “maintain” software, it must be re-engineered by software professionals, 
significantly more expensive than typical hardware maintainers 
• The rate of change for software systems is much higher than hardware systems: 
 Maintenance – Latent errors are expected 
 Interface – Changes in other components of the “system of systems” drive 
software changes  
 Upgrades – Required often to maintain system effectiveness 
Contributing Factors 
There are some contributing factors to how the software is physically architected 
which have a huge impact on costs related to resolving issues, scalability, maintaining 
or other required alterations. Among these are: 
Software engineering. With over 50 years of history, Software Engineering is 
still immature. We do not have a standardized language to build software. We still lack 
the skills and the skill sets that are required to build upon a standard body of knowledge 
like more mature engineering disciplines have overtime.  Unfortunately, when a new 
software system is built specifically for the DOD, it can rarely be reused.  The system is 
built from scratch. It’s like implementing and maintaining a new technology every time 
we build a new software system. 
Software is significantly unbounded.  Software doesn’t have the physical 
world as a concern.  It is literally the logic processes that are involved with the coders 
and the people who are involved with the design of the software. 
Engineering discipline is often linked to the frequency and impact of latent 
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Requirements Creep has dramatic negative effect on software architecture. The 
negative effect is more dramatic than it is in hardware due to the complexities and the 
interoperability pieces that go with the software.  As we saw in John Dillard’s 
presentation, we set up acquisition processes against the milestones. Those milestones 
are fixed in concrete because of the funding system that goes along with them.   
It is well documented that software development is an event-driven process.  
Trying to put an event-driven process function within a milestone model creates 
significant issues, especially when imposed milestones are driven by oversight rather 
than clear software evaluation points. The first thing that typically happens is the 
engineering discipline is lost.  The focus becomes milestone driven, rather than quality, 
losing engineering discipline and the ability to maintain the system. 
The first casualty is documentation, which is critical for the supportability of the 
software. Processes are shortened, then “undisciplined coding to get functionality and 
move on,” becomes the continual loop. As noted above, 
• Software design for supportability is critical to how costly maintenance, 
interfacing and upgrades are to perform 
• Software engineering is immature and significantly unbounded 
• Software engineering discipline is linked to the frequency and impact of latent 
errors 
• Requirements Creep has dramatic negative effect on software architecture 
• Software development is event-driven and juxtaposed to the DOD Milestone 
driven process 
 Engineering discipline often lost when crashing for a milestone 
 Documentation is the first casualty 
RFP & Source Selection 
How do we go about doing the request for proposal and the source selection on 
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hardware centric systems.  With recent reforms toward performance-based 
specification, a lot of detail is left out.  This is purposeful to garner innovation.  
Requirements analysis is weakened as the contractor is required to make sense of 
open-ended requirements and maintain cohesion within the system of systems.    
Without clear requirement expectations, realistic estimates of time, effort, dollars 
and delivery schedule are nearly impossible. It also becomes much more difficult to 
compare contractors based on quantifiable selection factors like price and schedule. 
While the intent is quality innovation at a good price, the results are foggy requirements 
with unrealistic deliverables and schedule. Quality software innovation takes back seat 
to the selection process where evaluation boards only have the RFP type data to 
evaluate the software development realism.  The net effect; we still do not have an 
objective way of determining whether or not what is proposed and ultimately awarded 
will actually be anywhere near the reality of developing that software component of the 
system. In summary,  
• Inadequate Requirements analysis leads to vague RFP performance 
specification 
• Resulting proposals significantly underestimate the cost and time required to 
engineer the software components 
• Competitive pressures cause potential contractors to propose short schedules 
and low costs 
• Source selection criteria typically weighted toward lower cost, shorter schedule 
proposals 
• Source Selection Evaluation Boards have only RFP specifications and little other 
capability to evaluate software development proposal realism 
Pathologies 
Here are some of the pathologies that go along with the software development 
piece.  First, requirements are not broken into the level of detail required. Currently in 
the RFP process, level three is required of the work breakdown structure. This is one 
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the contractor to build as they would in a mature engineering environment such as with 
hardware. 
Software requires a much more detailed approach to system requirements. If one 
leaves software system architecture to the interpretation of the software developer 
without clear requirements, poor design becomes standard. As noted previously, this 
introduces critical functional errors to the software system of systems as new software 
is built with top-line functionality only.  
It is more costly to fix errors the later they are discovered in the software 
production cycle. Strong requirements, refined over time, develop stronger processes. 
Requirements creep is part of managing the software lifecycle; without a clear structure 
in place, late requirements clarification/changes will severely impact the software 
architecture and lengthen the time and costs associated with error corrections. In 
summary, 
• Government Requirements Analysis for RFP preparation is inadequate 
• 3 levels of WBS does not provide potential contractors enough detail for realistic 
software development estimates 
• Leaving requirements interpretation to software contractor will result in poor 
design 
• Requirements creep follows insufficient analysis 
• Late requirements clarification/changes severely impacts the software 
architecture 
Emerging Recommendations 
Somehow, we have to get our hands around how the support costs of weapons 
systems are contributing to TOC, especially the software component. It is important that 
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It is important that we improve the requirements analysis.  Expecting to hand off 
a level-three work breakdown structure to a software intensive system and hoping to get 
a quality product is not realistic.  At the very minimum, we need to tell contractors what 
is the current, planned and projected capability upgrades.  Even though software is ever 
changing, it is important that we make a cut at requirements and upgrade expectations 
to enable contractors to build efficiently in the front end and construct the software 
architecture for flexibility to accommodate those changes and upgrades. This should 
also be applied for software interfaces.  In short, we must: 
• Capture software supportability costs 
• Improve Requirements Analysis 
 Develop the WBS well beyond 3 levels and address, as a minimum: 
• Current, planned & projected capability upgrades 
• Current, planned & projected interoperability interface requirements 
We require higher safety and security requirements on intensive software 
systems, beyond what is readily available in most of the commercial markets.  
Exception or fault handling: There are current software systems in the tactical 
world that lock up when a fault occurs. In a combat situation, this is deadly. A system 
needs to have a ‘reject faults’ capability, to move on and continue to function. 
Recovery technique:  For example, I spoke to a Navy commander who was 
involved with the STENNIS.  A software glitch in the system caused the ship not to 
know where it was in the world.  They didn’t want to get too close to land masses or any 
other ships so they steamed around for about six hours rebooting the software. 
Reliability:  Our requirements for reliability in our weapon systems are 
thousands of times higher than what we expect from the software sitting on our desks 
and in our offices. 
Redundant Capability: What do we need to make sure it does not go down 
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• Safety/Security requirements specifications 
 Degraded operations 
 Exception/fault handling 
 Recovery technique & timelines 
 Reliability 
 Redundant capability requirements 
Conclusion 
The software component of our increasingly high-technology weapons systems 
provides the capabilities and lethality desired for our forces, but is potentially 
devastating to our ability to cost-effectively maintain their advantages.   
The complexity of individual software-intensive systems is significantly 
compounded when they are combined in a “system of systems” architecture.  The initial 
software architecture, driven by how requirements are translated into performance 
specifications, is critical in determining how much maintenance will be required and how 
much effort will be required in the necessary maintenance actions.   
To gain more effective software design, significantly more effort is required in 
requirements analyses. Performance specifications must be much more developed than 
is typical in the current development model.  Handing off performance specifications 
developed through just three levels of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for 
software intensive systems is insufficient in a complex, system of systems environment 
dependent on seamless interfaces in an ever-changing architecture.   
Significant development, incorporating all critical performance features, interface 
requirements, and known, planned and projected upgrades, changes and 
enhancements must be effectively transmitted to the developer for consideration in the 
software design and architecture.   
Without these efforts, software supportability costs will continue to skyrocket as 
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accommodate interface and capability changes that were known or could have been 
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